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Abstract
This paper studies a new and more general
axiomatization than one presented in [6] for
preference on likelihood gambles. Likelihood
gambles describe actions in a situation where
a decision maker knows multiple probabilis-
tic models and a random sample generated
from one of those models but does not know
prior probability of models. This new axiom
system is inspired by Jensen’s axiomatization
of probabilistic gambles. Our approach pro-
vides a new perspective to the role of data in
decision making under ambiguity.
1 Likelihood gambles
Likelihood gambles introduced in [5, 6] describe ac-
tions in situation of model ambiguity characterized by
(1) there are multiple probabilistic models; (2) there is
data providing likelihoods for the models and (3) there
is no prior probability about the models.
Formally, we consider a general problem described by
a tuple (X,Y,Θ,A,x). X,Y are variables describing
a phenomenon of interest. X is experiment variable
whose values can be observed through experiments or
data gathering (e.g. lab test results, clinical observa-
tions). Y is utility variable whose values determine the
utility of actions (e.g. stages of disease, relative size
of the tumor). Θ is the set of models that encode the
knowledge about the phenomenon. To be precise, Θ
is a set of indices and knowledge is encoded in prob-
ability functions Prθ(X,Y ) for θ ∈ Θ. A is the set
of alternative actions (e.g. surgery, radiation therapy,
chemotherapy) that are functions from utility variable
Y to the unit interval [0, 1] representing utility1. Fi-
∗I thank Bharat Rao for encouragement and support
and UAI-2006 referees for their constructive comments.
1One should note that the use of utility rather than
nally, evidence/data/observation gathered on experi-
ment variable is X = x. A fundamental question to
be answered is which among the alternative actions is
the best choice given the information.
We introduce the concept of likelihood gambles and de-
rive a pricing formula that will allow their comparison.
Note that given a model θ ∈ Θ and observation x, dis-
tribution on utility variable Y is Prθ(y|x). According
to the classical Bayesian decision theory actions a ∈ A
are values by their expected utility
Eθ(a) =
∫
y
a(y)Prθ(y|x)dy (1)
Beside effecting individual models through condition-
alization, data also carries information about models.
We will use the term ambiguity to denote the uncer-
tainty about models and reserve the term risk for the
uncertainty about variable realization. This terminol-
ogy is apt because if to understand a variable is to
know its probability distribution, the presence of mul-
tiple models of a variable means there are more than
one ways to understand it. To this end we’ll invoke a
fundamental principle of statistics
Likelihood principle (LP) All information about
models in a data is contained in likelihood function.
Moreover, two likelihood functions are equivalent if one
is a scalar multiple of the other.
The likelihood of a model is the probability that the
model predicts the data: ℓθ = Prθ(x). This con-
troversial principle lies in the heart of Bayesian ap-
proach to statistics (see for example [1]). Although
LP does not agree with methodology of frequentist
statistics which takes into analysis not only data itself
but also data gathering protocol (experiment design),
money to measure the consequences of actions makes the
discussion simpler because the risk attitude factor has been
assumed away. From now on we can think of dollar sign
($) as a symbol of the utility currency in which actions are
measured.
likelihood is essential in both estimation theory and
hypothesis testing theory.
A consequence of the likelihood principle is evidence
exchangeability. For a set of models Θ, two pieces of
evidence x and x′ are considered equivalent if Prθ(x) =
cPrθ(x
′) for θ ∈ Θ and some constant c. This postulate
is directly followed from the second part of likelihood
principle. For example a four-face die is known to have
distribution according to either one of two probability
functions
red blue green yellow
Prθ1 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.4
Prθ2 0.3 0.15 0.3 0.25
Evidence exchangeability means that observing “red”
is equivalent to observing “blue” in terms of informa-
tion relevant to question which is the true distribution
of the die.
In (1), Eθ(a) was interpreted as the value of an ac-
tion given a model, now we turn other way around by
fixing action a and view Eθ(a) as the value of model
θ given action a. This switch of views is crucial to
understand this work and it mirrors model-evidence
switch that interprets the same quantity Prθ(x) either
as probability of evidence or as likelihood of a model.
Assumption 1 The value of an action in multi-model
situation is a function of two arguments: its values
given individual models and model ambiguity.
Another consequence of likelihood principle is model
exchangeability. For evidences x,x′ and two sets mod-
els Θ and Θ′, an action a is as valuable given Θ
as action a′ given Θ′ if there is a one-to-one map
m : Θ → Θ′ and a constant c such that Eθ(a) =
Em(θ)(a
′) and Prθ(x) = cPrm(θ)(x
′) for θ ∈ Θ. Condi-
tion Eθ(a) = Em(θ)(a
′) guarantees that values of ac-
tions are the same under both sets of models. Now, by
likelihood principle Prθ(x) = cPrm(θ)(x
′) means that
information bearing on models is the same under Θ
and Θ′. Since both arguments of action’s value are
the same, the values of the actions under Θ and Θ′
must be the same.
Consider the following example. There are two exper-
iments. In the first, two coins θ1 and θ2 are used. In
the second, θ′1 and θ
′
2 are used.
Coins head tail E(a)
θ1 0.5 0.5 0.5
θ2 0.4 0.6 0.4
a 1 0
Coins head tail E(a′)
θ′1 0 1.0 0.5
θ′2 0.2 0.8 0.4
a′ 0 0.5
θ1 is a fair coin, θ
′
1 is a double-tail coin, θ2 is a bias
coin of 4-to-6 head-tail ratio and θ′2 is bias coin of 2-to-
8 ratio. In each experiment a coin is picked at random
and is tossed. In the first one, it produces head. In
second experiment tail is observed. a is a lottery that
pays $1 if the next toss of the selected coin in experi-
ment 1 produces head and nothing otherwise. a′ pays
$0.5 if the next toss of the selected coin in experiment
2 produces tail. The model exchangeability implies
that given all that information the price one pays for
a should equal price paid for a′.
We call a pair of number (Prθ(x)/Eθ(a)) a likelihood
prospect (here “/” is a separation symbol and not a
division operation). The first number is the likelihood
of the model and the second number is its value. A
likelihood prospect describes a model in context of an
action and a piece of data. Thus, an action in a mul-
tiple model situation is described by a collection of
prospects {(Prθ(x)/Eθ(a))|θ ∈ Θ}.
Because of evidence exchangeabiliy we can abstract
away from direct reference to evidence. Let PrΘ(x)
def
=
maxθ∈Θ{Prθ(x)} and ℓθ = Prθ(x)/PrΘ(x) and thus
maxθ∈Θ{ℓθ} = 1. Using notation vθ = Eθ(a) we call
a set of prospects with normalized likelihood values a
likelihood gamble
{(ℓθ/vθ)|θ ∈ Θ} (2)
For example, actions a, a′ in the above example are
encoded by a likelihood gamble {1.0/0.5, 0.8/0.4}.
Note that when there is certainty about model i.e.,
Θ = {θ} the gamble corresponding to action a becomes
{1/vθ}. The value of this gamble is obviously just vθ.
We want to allow that the values for a gamble be other
gambles.
Definition 1 The set of likelihood gambles G is de-
fined recursively as follows. (i) [0, 1] ⊆ G; (ii) Let I be
a set of indices, ℓi ∈ [0, 1], maxi∈I ℓi = 1 and gi ∈ G
for i ∈ I then {(ℓi/gi)|i ∈ I} ∈ G; and (iii) Nothing
else belongs to G.
This definition makes the set of likelihood gambles a
mixture set in style of Herstein and Milnor [8] except
that the mixture rule is different.
Notation convention. All numbers in this paper are
between 0 and 1 (inclusive). Likelihood values are de-
noted by Greek letters α, β, γ. Likelihood functions
are normalized i.e., maximum likelihood is 1. Gam-
bles are denoted by Roman letters of both upper and
lower cases F,G,H, f, g, h. Greek letter θ is reserved
for model index. Upper case I, J as well as Θ are
model index sets.
Definition 2 The depth of a gamble is defined re-
cursively as follows. depth(x) = 0 for x ∈ [0, 1].
depth({αi/gi|1 ≤ i ≤ I}) = max{1 + depth(gi)|1 ≤
i ≤ I}.
Likelihood gambles can be given standard interpreta-
tion by using the thought experiment technique. Two
parties, “honest” Nature and Player, participate in the
following game. There is a pool of hypotheses Θ that
correspond to probability functions Prθ on variable X.
Nature picks a hypothesis according to a secret pro-
tocol and generates an observation X = x which is
revealed to Player. A gamble G = {(ℓθ/gθ)|θ ∈ Θ}
where (ℓθ) is the normalized likelihood function ob-
tained from X = x, is a contract that honest Nature
pays Player reward gθ if θ is the hypothesis Nature
actually uses. In case gθ is a constant gamble (a value
in [0, 1]), “paying” literally means that Player will re-
ceives that amount of utility. In case gθ is another
gamble, “paying” means offering an opportunity to
play this gamble. Honesty is necessary in this game be-
cause only Nature - the paying party - knows the truth
on which rewards are based. This is not a zero-sum
game in a sense that Nature does not try to minimize
Player’s wealth. We’ll study the game from Player’s
point of view.
From now the thought experiment interpretation will
be used throughout. We are satisfied that behind each
gamble is an action in a situation described by a set
of models and a piece of data.
A reasonable assumption we want to make explicit
here is independence. That is probability functions
used in different gambles are mutually independent.
Suppose θ and θ′ are hypotheses used in gambles G
and G′. They are probability functions on variables X
and X ′ respectively. Furthermore data observed are
X = x and X ′ = x′. For examples θ is a hypothe-
sis about a coin (X) while θ′ about a die (X ′) and
data is “coin lands Head” and “die rolls 3”. Thus, the
totality of evidence available is what we call a com-
pound data (x, x′). Since X ′ = x′ is irrelevant to hy-
pothesis θ, under compound data (x, x′), the likelihood
of model θ remains the same as under X = x alone.
However, one can join θ, θ′ together to form a new
compound model on (X,X ′) denoted by (θ, θ′) then
the likelihood of observing the compound data under
this compound hypothesis is the product of likelihoods
Pr(θ,θ′)((x, x
′)) = Prθ(x)Prθ′(x
′)
Definition 3 Let θ and θ′ be independent hypotheses
on variables X,X ′ respectively. Suppose X = x and
X ′ = x′ are observed, the likelihood of compound model
(θ, θ′) is ℓ(θ,θ′)(x, x
′)
def
= Prθ(X = x)Prθ′(X
′ = x′)
2 Axiomatization
Following von Neumann-Morgenstern’s approach we
study a preference relation  on likelihood gambles
and its derivative forms: equivalence relations f∼g iff
fg and gf ; f≻g iff fg and g 6 f . We postulate
the following axioms.
(A1) Weak order.  is complete and transitive.
(A2) Archimedian axiom. If f≻g≻h then there exist
normalized likelihood vectors (αi) and (βi) such
that {α1/f, α2/h}≻g and g≻{β1/f, β2/h}.
(A3) Independence. Suppose fg and let (αi) be
a normalized likelihood vector then for any h
{α1/f, α2/h}{α1/g, α2/h}.
(A4) Compound gamble. Suppose f1 = {β1i/f1i|1 ≤
i ≤ I} and f2 = {β2j/f2j |1 ≤ j ≤ J}
then {α1/f1, α2/f2}∼{α1β1i/f1i|1 ≤ i ≤ I} ∪
{α2β2j/f2j |1 ≤ j ≤ J}.
(A5) Idempotence. For any index set I {αi/f |1 ≤ i ≤
I}∼f
This axiom system is based on well known Jensen’s
axiomatization for probabilistic gambles [9]. Basic ob-
jects in von Neumann-Morgenstern approach are lot-
teries which are probability distributions of finite sup-
port on [0, 1] - the set of outcomes. Lotteries are de-
noted by roman letters p, q, r. p(x) is the probability
that p pays reward x. Compound lotteries are con-
structed by substitution of rewards by lotteries. Sup-
pose p, q are lotteries. {α/p, (1−α)/q} denotes a com-
pound lottery that pays p with probability α and q
with probability 1− α.
{α/p, (1− α)/q}
def
= αp+ (1− α)q (3)
In other words, {α/p, (1 − α)/q}(x) = αp(x) + (1 −
α)q(x) for any x ∈ [0, 1]. Denote by L the set of lot-
teries. The following axioms are the conditions for
von Neumann-Morgenstern representation theorem of
preference on probabilistic gambles.
(J1) Weak order. vnm is complete and transitive.
(J2) Archimedian. For p, q, r ∈ L such that
p ≻vnm q ≻vnm r then there exist α, β such that
αp+ (1− α)r ≻vnm q and q ≻vnm βp+ (1− β)r
(J3) Independence. For all p, q, r ∈ L and α ∈ [0, 1]
then p vnm q iff αp+(1−α)r vnm αq+(1−α)r.
The similarity between A1 − A3 and J1 − J3 is ev-
ident. One just need to substitute probability func-
tion for normalized likelihood function and recognize
the difference in notation for compound probabilistic
lotteries αp+ (1−α)q and compound likelihood gam-
bles {α/f, β/g}. Less noticeable is the fact that A3
is weaker than J3 because A3 is an “if” proposition
whereas J3 is an “iff” proposition. The crucial dif-
ference between Jensen’s system and our axioms is in
the ways compound lotteries (gambles) are treated.
In Jensen’s formulation, compound lotteries are linear
combination of lotteries. This identity is considered so
basic that it is formulated as a definition rather than
as an axiom which is open for debate. However, the
logic behind equational definition (3) and A4 is the
same. It requires that probability functions in differ-
ent lotteries or gambles are independent so that they
can be combined through multiplication. Idempotence
A5 is also a consequence of equation (3). By definition
(αp + (1 − α)p)(x) = αp(x) + (1 − α)p(x) = p(x) for
x ∈ [0, 1].
The Jensenian root of our axiom system is a powerful
argument for its rationality and acceptance.
We now return to preference relation  over likelihood
gambles. In the following we’ll state and prove results
leading to a representation theorem for . We also
provide a constructive proof that the axiom system
is consistent or free from contradiction. Due to space
limit, we’ll omit most of the proofs which can be found
in full version of the paper.
Corollary 1
(i) A3 implies f∼g ⇒ {α1/f, α2/h}∼{α1/g, α2/h}.
(ii) A5 implies h∼{1/h} for any h.
Theorem 1 Assume A1 − A5 hold. Let G =
{αi/gi|i ∈ Θ}, for any partition Θ1 ∪ Θ2 = Θ and
Θ1 ∩ Θ2 = ∅ such that αΘ1
def
= max{αi|i ∈ Θ1} > 0
then
G∼{αΘ1/{α
′
i/gi|i ∈ Θ1}, GΘ2} (4)
where GΘ2
def
= {αi/gi|i ∈ Θ2} and α
′
i = αi/αΘ1 .
According to theorem 1 any subset of prospects in a
gamble can be replaced by a single prospect whose
reward is a gamble constructed from the prospects to
be replaced.
Since the meaning of constant gambles x ∈ [0, 1] in
G is utility value, we’ll impose an axiom to reconcile
utility numerical order and preference.
(A6) Numerical order. For x, y ∈ [0, 1], x ≥ y iff xy.
For the rest of this paper, we assume that A1 − A6
hold.
Theorem 2 1f0 for any f ∈ G.
This theorem states that all gambles are bounded by
extreme values 0, 1.
Definition 4 Likelihood gambles of the form
{α/1, β/0} is called canonical gambles.
Theorem 3 For any x ∈ [0, 1] there exists
a normalized likelihood vector (α0, α1) such that
x∼{α0/0, α1/1}. Furthermore, 1∼{0/0, 1/1} and
0∼{1/0, 0/1}.
This theorem states that for every value x there is a
canonical gamble equivalent to it.
Theorem 4 {α1/1, β1/0}{α2/1, β2/0} if α1 ≥ α2
and β1 ≤ β2.
Because canonical gambles have the same set of re-
wards i.e. {0, 1}, the comparison is reduced to the like-
lihoods. The two conditions on αi, βi can be summa-
rized by one condition on likelihood ratio. The higher
the likelihood ratio in favor of getting 1 the better.
Theorem 5
(i) If {1/1, β1/0}∼{1/1, β2/0} and β1 > β2 then
{1/1, β1/0}∼{1/1, β3/0} for any β3 ≤ β1.
(ii) If {α1/1, 1/0}∼{α2/1, 1/0} and α1 < α2 then
{α3/1, 1/0}∼{α2/1, 1/0} for any α3 ≤ α2.
(iii) {1/1, β/0}≻{α/1, 1/0} for 0 ≤ α < 1, 0 ≤ β < 1.
This theorem shows the “stickiness” of likelihood gam-
bles. This stickiness can occur close to 0 and 1. Intu-
itively, when likelihood ratio in favor (against) a hy-
pothesis is overwhelming one could consider this hy-
pothesis true (false).
Theorem 6 For any g ∈ G there is a normalized like-
lihood vector (α, β) such that g∼{α/1, β/0}.
This theorem shows that the set of canonical gam-
bles is rich enough to represent any likelihood gamble.
This is a crucial observation. One can compare any
two gambles by first reducing them to their equivalent
canonical forms and then using theorem 4 to compare
the canonical forms.
Definition 5
(i) B
def
= {〈α, β〉|0 ≤ α, β ≤ 1,max(α, β) = 1} - a set
of 2-dimensional vectors represented by points in top
and right borders of the unit square.
(ii) For 〈α1, β1〉, 〈α2, β2〉 ∈ B and scalar 1 ≤ γ ≤ 1
define operations max and product as
max(〈α1, β1〉, 〈α2, β2〉)
def
= 〈max(α1, α2),max(β1, β2)〉
γ〈α1, β1〉
def
= 〈γα1, γα2〉
(iii) An order ≥∗ on B is defined as
〈α1, β1〉≥∗〈α2, β2〉 iff α1 ≥ α2 & β1 ≤ β2
(iv) Equality (=) and strict order ( >∗ ) are defined
as follows. 〈α1, β1〉 = 〈α2, β2〉 iff 〈α1, β1〉≥∗〈α2, β2〉
and 〈α2, β2〉≥∗〈α1, β1〉. 〈α1, β1〉 >∗ 〈α2, β2〉 iff
〈α1, β1〉≥∗〈α2, β2〉 and 〈α2, β2〉 6 ≥∗〈α1, β1〉
Product of scalar and vector is defined as usual while
maximization of vectors is pointwise maximization. It
is also easy to verify
〈α1, β1〉 = 〈α2, β2〉 iff α1 = α2 & β1 = β2 (5)
〈α1, β1〉 >∗ 〈α2, β2〉 iff
{
(α1 > α2 & β1 ≤ β2) ∨
(α1 ≥ α2 & β1 < β2)
(6)
Definition 6 A relation  on G×G is represented by
relation ≥∗ on B × B if there is a function U : G → B
such that g1g2 iff U(g1)≥∗U(g2).
Definition 7 For x ∈ [0, 1], Gx is the set of
canonical gambles that are indifferent to x i.e.,
Gx
def
= {{α/1, β/0}|max(α, β) = 1, α ≥ 0, β ≥
0, {α/1, β/0}∼x}
Note that if 0 < x < 1 then Gx is a singleton because
otherwise theorem 5 would imply that either x∼1 or
x∼0 that would contradict A6. For x = 0 or x = 1 we
designate one gamble g(x) in Gx as follows.
g(0)
def
= {α∗/1, 1/0} and g(1)
def
= {1/1, β∗/0} (7)
where α∗
def
= max{α|{α/1, 1/0} ∈ G0} and β
∗ def=
max{β|{1/1, β/0} ∈ G1}.
Theorem 7 Suppose function U : G → B is defined
recursively as follows. For x ∈ [0, 1]
U(x) 7→ 〈αx, βx〉 where g(x) = {αx/1, βx/0} (8)
U({γi/gi|1 ≤ i ≤ I}) 7→ max
1≤i≤I
{γiU(gi)} (9)
If g1∼g2 then U(g1) = U(g2).
Lemma 1 Assume U is defined by equations 8, 9, if
U({α/1, β/0}) = 〈a, b〉 then {α/1, β/0}∼{a/1, b/0}.
Theorem 8 If relation  satisfies axioms A1 − A6
then it is represented by ≥∗.
Theorem 9 For u : G → B that has the following
properties
(i) u(x)≥∗u(y) iff 1 ≥ x ≥ y ≥ 0
(ii) u({γi/gi|1 ≤ i ≤ I}) = maxi{γiu(gi)}
relation u defined by g1 u g2 iff u(g1)≥∗u(g2) sat-
isfies axioms A1−A6.
3 Ambiguity attitude
In this section, we’ll study how to characterize a util-
ity function. It is clear from eq. (9) that a utility
function is completely determined by its values on
constant gambles. Recall that U(x) = 〈a, b〉 implies
x∼{a/1, b/0}. To be specific let us consider two coins
θ1 and θ2 with Prθ1(Head) ∝ a and Prθ2(Head) ∝
b.2 One of them is picked and tossed landing Head.
{a/1, b/0} is the contract that pays $1 if the selected
coin is θ1, and $0 otherwise. For Player holding
U(x) = 〈a, b〉, the fair price for contract {a/1, b/0}
is x.
Imagine for a moment that our Player is a pure
Bayesianist who in order to calculate a fair price of
the contract would assign prior probability Pr(θ1) = ρ
that θ1 would be picked (θ2 would be selected with
probability 1− ρ). With this prior information, using
Bayes theorem, posterior odd of θ1 is
oddpost =
Pr(θ1)
Pr(θ2)
Prθ1(Head)
Prθ2(Head)
=
ρ
1− ρ
a
b
(10)
The (posterior) probability that the selected coin is θi
after observing Head is Pr(θ1|Head) = oddpost/(1 +
oddpost) and Pr(θ2|Head) = 1/(1 + oddpost). Now the
contract that pays $1 if θ1 and $0 if θ2 is a probabilistic
gamble whose expected value is
Pr(θ1|Head) ∗ 1+Pr(θ0|Head) ∗ 0 =
oddpost
1 + oddpost
(11)
Since x is a fair price for the contract {a/1, b/0}
x =
oddpost
1 + oddpost
(12)
Solving (12) for oddpost, we have
oddpost =
x
1− x
(13)
By eqs. 10 and 13, taking logarithm and using logit
abbreviation
logit(z)
def
= ln
(
z
1− z
)
for z ∈ (0, 1) (14)
we have the basic equation for canonical gambles:
logit(ρ) + ln
(a
b
)
= logit(x). (15)
The significance of equation (15) is that it allows in-
ference of unobserved prior from observed pricing of
a likelihood gamble. For this reason, ρ is called im-
plicit prior. It is important to note that derivation
2We use ∝ rather than equality because (a, b) is sup-
posed to be normalized likelihood vector.
of ρ does not hinge on prior information about how
likely each coin is selected. Due to model exchange-
ability property, the coins can be substituted by dice
or in fact any probability devices as long as likelihood
ratio obtained from data remains unchanged. Since ρ
is independent of physical devices actually used in a
gamble, it must be an attribute of the decision maker
and therefofe we use term ambiguity attitude for it. In
particular logit(ρ) is ambiguity premium. In this ter-
minology equation (15) reads: the utility logit equals
the sum of logarithm of likelihood ratio and ambiguity
premium.
Intuitive meaning of ambiguity premium can be seen
in eq. (15) by setting a = b. Then logit(ρ) = logit(x).
In other words, ambiguity premium is the logit of the
price that Player pays for a fair likelihood gamble in
which the available evidence equally supports possibil-
ities of getting $1 and getting $0. Since logit(ρ) can be
anywhere in the real line, an obvious classification is
made by comparing with 0. logit(ρ) > 0 signifies ambi-
guity seeking. Player is willing to pay more than $0.5
for the fair gamble. logit(ρ) < 0 signifies ambiguity
averse, the price for the fair gamble is less than $0.5.
logit(ρ) = 0 is ambiguity neutral, the price Player pays
is $0.5.
4 Pricing under constant ambiguity
aversion
It should be noted here that ambiguity premium is cal-
culated on the basis of an observed pricing. In princi-
ple, that value can vary across gambles as long as the
monotonicity condition x ≥ y iff U(x)≥∗U(y) is satis-
fied. In order to arrive at a closed form pricing formula
we will assume ambiguity premium to be constant.
Assumption 2 Each decision maker has a constant
ambiguity premium.
We want to find pricing formula for likelihood gamble
G = {(ℓi/vi)|1 ≤ i ≤ I} that represents value of an
action in a multiple model situation. Denote by c the
ambiguity attitude of Player guaranteed by assump-
tion 2 i.e. c = logit(ρ). Plug that into eq. (15) and
taking into account the fact that (a, b) is a normalized
likelihood vector{
c+ ln
(
a
b
)
= logit(x)
max(a, b) = 1
(16)
Solve (16) for a, b we have{
a = min(1, exp(logit(x)− c))
b = min(1, (exp(logit(x)− c))−1)
(17)
By eq. (9) we have
U(G) = max
i
(ℓiU(vi)) = max
i
(ℓi〈ai, bi〉)
=
〈
max
i
(ℓiai),max
i
(ℓibi)
〉
(18)
where ai, bi are determined by equation (17) substitut-
ing x by vi.
Let v be the price of G. That is v is a constant gamble
such that v∼G. Using equation (15) again we have
logit(v) = ln
(
maxi(ℓiai)
maxi(ℓibi)
)
+ c = A (19)
Denoting the right hand side of (19) by A and solve
this equation for v we have pricing formula which has
the form of the logistic function:
v =
exp(A)
1 + exp(A)
=
1
1 + exp(−A)
(20)
5 An example
Let us consider an example. There is a coin whose bias
is unknown. Let p be the probability of Head. The fact
that bias is unknown implies p ∈ [0, 1]. A gambler is
allowed to observe m tosses. After that she is asked
to bet on (m + 1)th toss. Specifically, she is asked to
name a price for gamble a that pays $1 if (m + 1)th
toss turns up Head and $0 if it turns Tail.3 That is all
she knows about the gamble.
Thus, the set of plausible models (indexed by coin
bias) Θ = [0, 1]. X ∼ B(m, p) - binomial distri-
bution of m trials and probability of success p. Y
is a Bernoulli variable with probability of success p
i.e., Y ∼ B(1, p). x is the observed number of suc-
cesses in m experimental tosses. Action a is defined
as a(success) = 1 and a(failure) = 0. Clearly, under
model p the expected utility of a is Ep(a) = p.
A Bayesian approach in this case would call for the
use of noninformative prior on p which can be (1) uni-
form distribution; (2) Jeffreys prior and reference prior
which are the same in this case; and (3) prior proposed
by Novick and Hall. The posterior distributions from
these priors and data X = x are Beta distributions.
See Table 1 cited from [14]. Calculation shows that
the value of a under uniform prior, Jeffreys/reference
prior and Novick-Hall prior are (x + 1)/(m + 2),
(x+ .5)/(m+ 1) and x/m respectively.
In our approach, action a is represented by gambleG =
{ℓp/p|p ∈ [0, 1]} where ℓp is the normalized likelihood
of model p from data X = x.
ℓp ∝
(
m
x
)
px(1− p)(m−x) (21)
3Recall that $ is utility currency and gambler’s risk at-
titude is assumed away.
Method Prior density Posterior density E(p|X = x)
(unnormalized) Pr(p|x)
Uniform 1 Be(p|x+ 1,m− x+ 1) (x+ 1)/(m+ 2)
Jeffreys/Reference p−1/2(1− p)−1/2 Be(p|x+ .5,m− x+ .5) (x+ .5)/(m+ 1)
Novick-Hall p−1(1− p)−1 Be(p|x,m− x) x/m
Table 1: Noninformative priors for binomial model (Yang and Berger 1998)
# Likli- Uniform Jeffrey Novick
succ hood prior Ref. prior Hall prior
0 0.0373 0.0833 0.0455 0.0000
1 0.1476 0.1667 0.1364 0.1000
2 0.2489 0.2500 0.2273 0.2000
3 0.3494 0.3333 0.3182 0.3000
4 0.4498 0.4167 0.4091 0.4000
5 0.5000 0.5000 0.5000 0.5000
6 0.5502 0.5833 0.5909 0.6000
7 0.6506 0.6667 0.6818 0.7000
8 0.7511 0.7500 0.7727 0.8000
9 0.8524 0.8333 0.8636 0.9000
10 0.9627 0.9167 0.9545 1.0000
Table 2: Pricing by likelihood method and Bayesian
method with various priors
For c = 0, αp = min(1, exp(logit(p))) and βp =
min(1, 1/ exp(logit(p))) Thus, α = max0≤p≤1(ℓpαp)
and β = max0≤p≤1(ℓpβp). By eq. 20 v = (α/β)/(1 +
α/β).
Table 2 presents the values for the gamble found by
likelihood pricing method and Bayesian method with
various non-informative priors when number of trials
m = 10.
6 Related works
The problem of ambiguity has been extensively stud-
ied in Economics literature. Knight [11] is often at-
tributed the distinction between risk and uncertainty.
The former corresponds to situations where a unique
probability function on relevant event space is known
while the later, Knightian uncertainty, corresponds to
situations where there are more than one plausible
probability functions. Ellsberg [4] who introduces the
term ambiguity has shown that certain patterns of ra-
tional behavior are not compatible with Savage’s ax-
ioms that are necessary and sufficient condition for the
existence of a unique subjective probability function.
Schmeidler [12] describes a decision theoretic model
of ambiguity. He introduces Choquet expected utility
(CEU) model whereby acts are evaluated by Choquet
expected utility wrt a non-additive uncertainty mea-
sure. Gilboa and Schmeidler [7] suggest that a de-
cision maker can entertain a set of (additive) proba-
bility functions. Each act is evaluated to the mini-
mal expected utility (MEU). In an important special
case, CEU and MEU are equivalent. More recently
Klibanoff et al [10] propose a model in which an act
f is evaluated by Eµφ(Epi(u ◦ f)) where u is (first or-
der) utility function reflecting risk attitude, π ∈ Π
- the set of relevant probability functions and µ is a
(second order) probability function over Π and φ is a
second order utility function reflecting ambiguity atti-
tude. This model basically applies subjective expected
utility (SEU) twice. Given probability function π and
(first order) utility function u, an act is evaluated to
vf,pi
def
= Epi(u ◦ f). Given second order probability
function µ (prior probability) over the set of proba-
bility functions Π and second order utility function φ,
the act is evaluated to vf = Eµvf,pi.
In AI literature, the problem of uncertainty is mostly
discussed in terms of representation and reasoning.
Decision making process for various reasons does not
get attention it deserves. Chu and Halpern [2, 3] for-
mulate a general decision rule called generalized ex-
pected utility (GEU). The key construct of GEU is
the notion of expectation domain where combination
of uncertainty with utility and combination of utility
values are made.
This paper further develops a decision theory for likeli-
hood gambles introduced in [5, 6]. What distinguishes
this approach from others is the role of data. In MEU
or GEU decision models acts are evaluated wrt un-
cetainty represented by a set of probability functions
which is assumed as given. There is no place for data in
decision making phase. Any data that exists has been
absorbed in the process that results in the probability
functions. In our approach, uncertainty is represented
by a likelihood function that is the direct result of rel-
evant probability functions and data.
In our previous works likelihood information is inter-
preted as belief function [13]. The axioms in this paper
are based on Jensenian axioms for probabilistic gam-
bles. They are intuitively appealing and are justified
by semantics of likelihood as a measure of evidence.
Most of axioms used previously are theorems followed
from axioms A1 − A6 in this paper. More important
we show that this new axiom system is more general
than one used before. The qualitative monotonicity
axiom in [5, 6] requires that
{α1/1, β1/0}{α2/1, β2/0} iff α1 ≥ α2 & β1 ≤ β2
(22)
In theorem 5, we show that axioms A1 − A6
permits {1/1, β1/0}∼{1/1, 0/0} with β1 > 0 and
{α1/1, 1/0}∼{0/1, 1/0} with α1 > 0. This preference
with stickiness obviously does not satisfy qualitative
monotonicity eq. (22) but is useful for expressiveness.
It corresponds to model selection behavior that picks
a model when likelihood ratio in its favor exceeding a
pre-defined threshold.
An important feature in our approach is the separation
between ambiguity attitude and risk attitude as well
as separation between ambiguity representing decision
maker information and ambiguity attitude represent-
ing her tastes. The model by Klibanoff et al also has
this property. But in our approach, the notion of am-
biguity attitude has different interpretation than one
suggested in [10] which is, in fact, the second order
risk attitude.
7 Conclusion and further work
This paper describes a novel approach to decision mak-
ing under ambiguity. We provide a new and more gen-
eral axiomatization of preference over likelihood gam-
bles. We argue that likelihood gambles adequately de-
scribe actions available to decision makers in situa-
tion where she knows experimental data and the set of
plausible models but not prior probability on models.
The axioms adopted for likelihood gambles have the
same logic and intuition as widely accepted Jensen’s
axioms for probabilistic gambles. We show that prefer-
ence relation over likelihood gambles is represented by
a utility function mapping gambles into 2-dimensional
vectors. We define the notion of ambiguity aversion
attitude to describe decision maker’s taste. Under con-
stant ambiguity aversion assumption, we derive pric-
ing formula for likelihood gambles. This formula has
a form of a familiar logistic function. Our approach
provides a new perspective on the role of data in deci-
sion making under ambiguity. Because subjective prior
probability on models is not required to find solutions
using this approach, the solutions can claim to be ob-
jective and be useful as a common ground for people
with different personal prior probabilities.
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